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OIL AND GAS FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
CURTIS C. LEVIN *
INTRODUCTION
T HE field of oil and gas has many interesting facets but none
more so than taxation. For the investor it seems to have a
lure unequalled. While there is much justification for this at-
tractiveness to a tax conscious investor, there are many pitfalls
for the unwary.
Some of these pitfalls will be exposed in this article. Since
we are generally surveying the oil and gas income tax field, it
is not our purpose to discuss all phases of various tax factors
involved in all oil and gas arrangements, nor is your writer so
bold as to suggest he is covering all tax factors in the particular
oil and gas problems discussed. This paper will discuss the nature
of certain fundamental concepts, highlight the more important
problems involved in the initial lease, exchanges, oil payments,
various pooling agreements, unitization, and touch on the effect
of the business form on oil tax problems. For a more detailed and
analytical discussion of any one topic, the reader is urged to pur-
sue his topic further in one of various tax services, law review
articles, or the more specialized oil and gas tax publications.
It is well to have in mind certain basic concepts fundamental
to virtually all oil and gas transactions.
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS
Depletion
The Code' permits a deduction for depletion 2 in computing
@ Member of the North Dakota Bar.
1. Section 23.-In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
(m) "Depletion.-In the case of mines, oil and gas wells, other natural deposits,
and timber, a reasonable allowance for depletion and for depreciation of improvements,
according to the peculiar conditions in each case; such reasonable allowance in all
cases to be made under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Commissioner,
with approval of the Secretary. In any case in which it is ascertained as a result of
operations or of development work that the recoverable units are greater or less
than the prior estimate thereof, then such prior estimate (but not the basis
for depletion) shall be revised and the allowance under this subsection for
subsequent taxable years shall be equitably apportioned between the lessor and lessee.
In the case of property held by one person for life with remainder to another person,
the deduction shall be computed as if the tenant were the absolute owner of the
property and shall be allowed to the life tenant. In the case of property held in trust
the allowable deduction shall be apportioned between the income beneficiaries and the
trustee in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the instrument creating the trust,
or, in the absence of such provisions, on the basis of the trust income allocable to each."
2. See Seidman's Legislative History of Federal Income Tax Laws (1938-1861) (1938)
for a complete story of the historical and legislative background culminating in the present
provision. Another source equally good is the depletion chapter in 4 Mertens, The Law
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net income. Section 114 (b) (3) refers specifically to oil and gas
depletion as follows:
"In the case of oil and gas wells the allowance for depletion
under section 23 (m) shall be 27) per centum of the gross
income from the property during the taxable year, excluding
from such gross income an amount equal to any rents or
royalties paid or incurred by the taxpayer in respect of the
property. Such allowance shall not exceed 50o of the net
income of the taxpayer (computed without allowance for de-
pletion) from the property,3 except that in no case shall the
depletion allowance under Section 23(m) be less than it would
be if computed without reference to this paragraph."
By virtue of Section 23(m ),4 a taxpayer is permitted cost de-
pletion' in lieu of percentage depletion if a greater benefit results.
A property's basis for this alternative computation may be cost,
March 1, 1913, value if held by the taxpayer prior thereto, adjusted
basis when property is acquired upon corporate dissolution, or fair
market value at time transmitted from the estate of a decedent.
Cost depletion is computed by dividing the estimated recoverable
units into the cost of the minerals and multiplying the result by
the number of units produced. This potential recovery is based on
engineering estimates and when proven accurate by later esti-
mates, depletion is based on the revised estimate of subsequent
years.' No retroactive revision will take place 7 .
It is well to remember that the depletion allowance rests solely
on legislative grace.' This view expressed by the Supreme Courto
apparently resulted from court interpretation of the 1909 Corpora-
tion Excise Tax Act where in Shatton's Independence Ltd. v.
Howbert'° it was held no constitutional requirement existed for
considering depletion in computing net income.
The 1916 Act is the first one in which the term "depletion" ap-
of Federal Income Taxation c.24 (1942). Another interesting analysis of the application of
depletion to various situations is found in Baker, The Nature of Depletable Income, 7 Tax
Law Review 267-299 (1952).
3. Regulations 118, Section 39.23(m)-i(1) defines property as follows:
"'The property', as used in Section 114(b) (2), (3), and (4) and Sections
29.23(m)-i to 29.23(m)-19, inclusive, means the interest owned by the taxpayer
in any mineral property. The taxpayer's interest in each separate mineral property is
a separate 'property'; but, where two or more mineral properties are included in a
single tract or parcel of land, the taxpayer's interest in such mineral properties may be
considered to be a single 'property' provided such treatment is consistently followed."
4. Note 1, supra.
5. For instructions regarding information required in support of a cost depletion





6. Note 1, supra. See also Petit Anse Co. v. Comm., 155 F. (2d) 797 (5th Cir. 1946).
7. Cf Marian A. B. Beck, 15 T. C. 658 (1950).
8. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
9. Ibid. See also Burnet v. Thompson Oil and Gas Co., 283 U.S. 301 (1931).
10. 231 U.S. 399 (1913).
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peared."1 It provided for a reasonable allowance for actual re-
duction in production.-1 2 Evidence of depletion allowance being
influenced by the high cost of development is noted in the provis-
ion for extraordinary allowance based on discovery value in the
1918 Act. 3
The 1924 Act limited the discovery allowance to 50% of the
net income from the property and formed the basis for the 50%
limitation on percentage depletion which in the 1926 Act sup-
planted the discovery provisions.
Since the 1926 Act has not been substantially changed, we thus
derived our present depletion provisions-the one type based on
cost and the other a percentage allowance. In principle cost de-
pletion is similar to depreciation in that it attempts to avoid taxing
the cost of an investment and contemplates three elements: (1)
cost basis, (2) an estimated total recoverable units in the property,
and (3) the number of units recovered during the taxable year
in question.




2. 100,000 units of oil in the property
3. 10,000 units recovered during year
Cost or $20,000 equals 20 a unit
total units 100,000
200 times 10,000 units equals $2000 cost depletion
Debit-Depletion expense $2000
Credit-Reserve for depletion $2000
This removes from the taxable area that portion of the cost
attributable to this year's production.
Percentage depletion represents a special incentive to encourage
exploration in a high cost risk area. A Texas court once said:
The uncertainties of finding oil, the vicissitudes of drilling
and production, the whimsical traits of wells after being
brought in, are common knowledge. All of them make such
a contract highly speculative in its nature. It is generally a
gamble upon the fickle wheel of fortune.'
4
It is a little difficult to apply "risk encouragement" reasoning "to
a royalty holder who is in effect a non-risk beneficiary.
11. The 1913 Act did provide for an allowance in case of mines of 5% of mine
output for the year. This allowance was referred to as depreciation.
12. Seidman's Legislative History of Federal Income Tax Laws, note 2, supra.
13. See I.T. 1920, I1-1 Cum. Bull. 188 (1924).
14. Logan v. Elliott, 61 S.W. (2d)157 (Tex. Civil App. 1933) writ of error dism'd.
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Who may take depletion deduction? The Regulations"5 in
substance allow a deduction for depletion to the owner of an
economic interest in mineral deposits which is any interest in
minerals in place acquired by investment, and who legally se-
cures his income from sales of such minerals to which he must
look for a return of his capital investment. The determination
of whether a taxpayer has an economic interest or capital invest-
ment in oil and gas in place, is made under federal income tax
laws and not local law."'
Intangible Drilling and Development Costs
One of the greatest inducements for investors to assume the
risk of financing drilling is that giving the taxpayer the option
to capitalize or expense "intangible drilling and development ex-
penses"17 when incurred.1s In view of a recent Bureau ruling, "
prepayment of such expenses may result in the Bureau allocating
them to the years service was rendered. Postponement by an accrual
taxpayer will likely be controlled by the same reasoning which
discourages prepayment. This ruling appears to follow general
Bureau policy to associate the expenditure with the service.
A taxpayer's failure to make a clear indication of his electioa
to capitalize or expense on the return for the first year such ex-
penses are incurred is deemed an election to capitalize.21
The recent case of Hawkeye Petroleum Corporation v. Com-
missioner2 casts some doubt on the apparently inflexible election
requirement.
The facts are:
1. In 1944 Hawkeye was allowed a deduction for "dry holes,
and worthless leases" which figure included intangible
drilling and development costs incurred in drilling a dry
hole. These were the only such costs incurred in 1944.
2. In 1945, Hawkeye showed a net loss on their tax return.
This loss included a deduction for intangible drilling and
development costs of productive wells which it elected to
expense.
The Commissioner disallowed the 1945 deduction claiming
Hawkeye had in 1944 elected to capitalize such costs. The Tax
15. Regulations 118, Section 39.23(m)-1.
16. Burton-Sutton Oil Company, Inc. v. Comm'r, 328 U.S. 25 (1946); Palmer v. Bender
287 U.S. 551, 557 (1933).
17. Regulations 118, Section 39.23(m)-16.
18. Internal Revenue Code, Section 23(a) (1) (A).
19. Revenue Ruling 170, I.R.B. 1953-18, 6 (September, 1953).
20. Regulations 118, Section 39.23(m)-16 (b).
21. 18 T. C. 1223 (1952).
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Court admitted that Hawkeye had not in its 1944 return made a
"clear indication" to expense intangibles but nevertheless con-
sidered the 1945 election sufficient because they apparently felt
the Regulations were not sufficiently clear where the facts limited
a taxpayer's choice to expensing or deducting as an ordinary loss.
It is doubtful if the case can be relied upon with any degree of
assurance as the court seemingly ignored that portion of the Regu-
lations which in effect says the election to treat intangibles incurred
with non-productive wells as an ordinary loss follows an election
to capitalize productive well costs.
The Regulations are quoted as follows:--
"Option with respect to cost of nonproductive wells: If the
operator has elected to capitalize intangible drilling and devel-
ment costs, then an additional option is accorded with respect
to intangible drilling and development costs incurred in drilling
a non-productive well. Such costs incurred in drilling a non-
productive well may be deducted by the taxpayer as. an ordi-
nary loss provided a proper election is made in the return for
the first taxable year beginning after December 31, 1942, in
which such a nonproductive well is completed." (Emphasis
supplied)
That portion of the Regulations cited follows the provision
permitting taxpayers to expense or capitalize in the first instance.
2 3
Thus, even though the Hawkeye case supports the taxpayer it
likewise re-emphasizes the need for a "clear indication". The
clearest indication is an affirmative statement on the tax return,
e.g., "Taxpayer elects to . ..."
Generally speaking, intangible costs are those having no sal-
vage value, automatically excluding such tangible property items
as costs of materials for construction in the wells, cost of tools,
machines, etc., and other item incident to the drilling process.
Expenses in connection with the actual operating process are
expenses and cannot be capitalized. A proper classification is
obviously important as capitalized intangible costs are returnable
through depletion.
The basis of an operator's investment to be divided between
that returnable through depreciation and depletion is influenced
by the option.
1) Costs expensed:
The amount recoverable through depletion will be limited
22. Regulations 118, Section 39.23(m)-16(b) (2) (IV).
23. Ibid., Section 39.23(m)-16(b) (1).
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to the costs of acquiring the lease24 since the tangible property
costs are depreciable and intangible costs are expenses. In-
cluded in the intangible expense category will be money ex-
pended for installation of tubing and casing up to and including
the Christmas Tree.25
2) Costs Capitalized:
Installation costs of the well equipment are considered part




Geological and Geophysical Expenses
Treatment for federal tax purposes of geological and geo-
physical expenditures, often referred to as "G and G" expenses, is in
somewhat of a state of flux. At least one writer considers this phase




Basically the problem is primarily one of allocating costs and
determining, when a choice is available, whether to capitalize as
a lease addition, or expense the item as a business expense.
Perhaps we are reasonably safe in making the following cate-
gorical statements:
1) "G and G" expenses incurred prior to acquisition of a
lease and thus in the nature of exploratory expenses are to be
capitalized..2 18 If more than one area of interest is disclosed,
the expenses must be prorated to different areas.2 9 If the areas
being reconnoitered are widely separated, a direct allocation
would seem to be required. If no area is disclosed, the ex-
penses incurred should be written off as a loss.
30
2) Cost of exploratory work over existing leases should be
capitalized."
3) Payments made to landowners for the privilege of making
geological surveys (known as shooting options) unaccompanied
by an option to lease are considered a rental and treated as such
by the recipient. If an option to lease is contained within the
shooting option (usual form) the amount paid would be con-
sidered in effect a bonus and subject to depletion.1
2
24. Ibid., Section 39.23(m)-10(a).
25. Mirn 6754, C.B. 1952-1, 30.
26. Ibid.
27. Hammonds, The Treatment of Oil and Gas Exploration Costs for Federal Income
Tax Purposes: Geological and Geophysical Expenditures. Second Annual Institute on Oil
and Gas Law Taxation, 441 (Southwestern Legal Foundation, 1951).
28. I.T. 4006, C.B. 1950(8) page 8; Schermerhorn Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 46
B.T.A. 151(1942).
29. I.T. 4006, note 28, supra.
30. Internal Revenue Code, Section 23 (e) or (f); Louisiana Land and Exploration Co.
7 T.C. 507 (1946).
31. Schermerhorn, note 28, supra.
32. Seale, Problems of Depletion in Oil and Gas Leases, Second Annual Institute on
Oil and Gas Law and Taxation, 351 et. seq. (Southwestern Legal Foundation, 1951).
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This gives us a brief insight into the problems facing a tax-
payer regarding G and G items. To fully realize the importance
of these items, one must remember that capitalized costs are re-
turnable only through depletion, depreciation, or sale or exchange.
It may well be that little benefit is thus received taxwise for a
capitalized item, if a taxpayer applies percentage depletion. :
Economic Interest
What is it? Why is it important?
In G.C.M. 22730,"', economic interest is defined in the following
manner:
"Assurance of a share upon production marks ownership of
an economic interest in oil and gas in place."
This definition was fortified in a leading 1946 case : ' when the
Supreme Court stated:
"Depletion depends only upon production. It is the lessor's,
lessee's or transferee's possibility of profit from the use of his
rights over production, 'dependent solely upon the extraction
of the oil', which marks an economic interest in the oil."
The existence of an economic interest is necessary before a de-
pletion deduction is allowable. ?i Uncertainty as to who is en-
titled to depletion deduction was somewhat removed by the
landmark case of Palmer v. Bender.3 7 This case removed the
necessity of determining a taxpayer's legal interest under a particu-
lar state law and substituted the concept of "economic interest."
Two other leading cases in 193238 led directly to the economic
interest doctrine in Palmer v. Bender.-9 The facts of this case are
substantially as follows:
Taxpayer, lessee of Louisiana oil and gas properties trans-
ferred the leases to the Ohio Oil Company for a cash bonus,
an oil payment, and an overriding royalty.
HELD: Regardless of the technical property rights created,
taxpayer had retained an economic interest and was thus en-
titled to a depletion deduction.
The depletion allowance allowable has to be apportioned among
those entitled to share in the oil, in proportion to their interests.4 0
33. Since percentage depletion is allowed in lieu of cost and not in addition thereto, it
is usually desirable to expense rather than capitalize G and G expenses.
34. 1941-1 C.B. 214.
35. Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Comm'r., 328 U.S. 25(1946).
36. Regulations 118, Section 39.23(m)-i.
37. 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
38. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932) holding the bonus payment was ordinary
income subject to depletion; Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.S. 229 (1932) where it is
stated "the bonus and royalties paid to the lessor both involve at least some return of his
capital investment in oil in the ground, for which a depletion allowance must be made ...
39. Note 37, supra.
40. Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 US. 312 (1934).
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The concept of "economic interest" must be distinguished from
an "economic advantage," from production created through a
contractual relation and owned by one with no capital investment
in the minerals. The absence of the latter, either in fact or by
imputation would seem to preclude depletion. Previous to the




We have noted that the percentage depletion allowance is
computed on gross income although limited to 50 per cent of
net income."
Gross income from the property as defined in the Regulations
4
is in effect the amount for which the taxpayer sells the oil in the
vicinity of the well. 4 5 Where the oil is not sold but used on the
property as fuel for an operation disassociated from production
it would likely be depletable. The income would be represented
by the fair market value at time of conversion. If the fuel is used
to further production, depletion will likely be denied on the
ground there has been no sale. The latter situation existed in
the recent LeDanois Land & Stone Co. case.
4 6
Exclusions from gross income are amounts paid in behalf of
interests of others in the particular oil production. Thus, the
gross income of an operator would be limited to the income
from production from his particular property interest.4 7 The party
41. Note 35, supra.
42. Helvering v. Bankline Oil Company, 303 U.S. 362 (1938) where a contract to
purchase oil at mouth of well was considered an economic advantage precluding the appli-
cation of depletion.
43. Internal Revenue Code, Section 114 (b) (3).
44. Regulations 118, Sec. 39.23(m)-1(F) states:
"In the case of oil and gas wells, "gross income from the property, as used in section
114(b) (3) means the amount for which the taxpayer sells the oil and gas in the immediate
vicinity of the well. If the oil and gas are not sold on the property but are manufactured
or converted into a refined product prior to sale, or are transported from the property prior
to sale, the gross income from the property shall be assumed to be equivalent to the
representative market or field price (as of the date of sale) of the oil and gas before
conversion or transportation."
GCM 22730, 1941-1 CB 214 further clarifies this definition by characterizing Tross
income as follows: ". . . the phrase 'gross income from property' in the depletion provision
is confined to the gross income from the extraction of oil rather than gross income [rom
the tract of land in all its uses."
45. This does not refer to the sale of oil and gas properties. See Elbe Oil Land
Development Co. v. Helvering, 303 U.S. 372(1937), holding that sales price of leases
was not gross income from the property; See also Darby-Lynde Co. v. Alexander, 51 F.(2d)
56(1931), cert. den. 284 U.S. 666(1931).
46. 18 T.C. 669(1952).
47. See Perkins v. Thomas, 301 U.S. 655(1936), holding that the-operator excludes
amounts pursuant to oil payments; on the same point, Ortiz Oil Co. v. Comm'r., 102 F.(2d)
508 (5th 1939), cert. den. 308 U.S. 566(1939); cf Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404
(1940) where the oil payment was payable in any and all events, not limited to production,
and thus in fact not a true oil payment; See also Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Comm'r. 326
U.S. 599(1946), net profits payment, reaffirmed in Burton-Sutton Oil Co., Inc. v. Comm'r.,
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entitled to the proceeds of the portion excluded includes it in
his gross income. This is entirely consistent with the theory that
depletion is computed on the gross income from each separate
property interest.
Examples of items which are properly deductible from gross
income to arrive at net income,48 which must be separately com-
puted for each separate property:4"
a. depreciation on equipment;'
b. expensed intangible drilling and development costs-t
c. attorney's fees under certain circumstances
5 2
d. interest paid on money borowed and invested in oil properties
e. allocable portion of overhead.
54
Since the amount of percentage depletion allowable is limited
by 50 per cent of net income, the importance of an accurate
determination of the proper items deductible is apparent.
The Property
A knowledge of what a property unit is in a particular case
is important for several reasons. A listing of some of these reasons
are:
1. Depletion is computed separately for each specific property. 5
2. Depreciation is computed separately for each property.56
3. The property is the ultimate unit to which I.T. 40065
7
allocates capitalized geological and geophysical costs. 58
The "Property" is defined by the Bureau59 as "... each separate
note 16, supra; Driscoll v. Comm'r., 3 T.C. 494, acq. 1944 CB 8, payments on oil :-uns
to mortgagee in liquidation of mortgage not assumed by purchaser burdening the royalty
interest purchased; J. S. Abererombie Co. v. Comm'r., 7 T.C. 120 aff'd. 162 F(2d) 338
(5th Cir. 1947), carried interests.
48. Regulations 118, See. 39.23(m)-l(g) states:
"Net income . . . means the 'gross income from the property' . . . less allowable
deductions . . ."
49. GCM 22956, 1941-2 C.B. 103.
50. Crews v. Comm'r., 108 F.(2d) 712 (10th Cir. 1939).
51. Wilshire Oil Co. Inc. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 90(1939), reb. den. 308 U.S. 638.
52. Note 50, supra.
53. Guanacevi Mining Co. v. Comm'r., 127 F.(2d) 49 (9th Cir. 1942).
54. See GCM 22956, note 49, supra, where it is stated in part:
Deductions (including items of expense) attributable to a specific property nre
those directly incurred with respect to such property, plus that portion of overhead or
general items and deductions allocable to depletable oil or mineral interests which is at-
tributable to such specific property ...
Overhead or general items of deductions must be, fairly allocated between depletable
properties and the activities relating thereto and all other types of properties and activities.
The part thereof allocable to depletable properties must then be fairly apportioned to the
several specific properties."
55. Note 40, supra. Internal Revenue Code, Section 114 (b)(1) and Section 114 (b)(3).
56. Internal Revenue Code, Section.114 (b)(1).
57. 1950 C.B. 48.
58. Breeding, Oil and Gas Accounting Problems, Third Annual Institute on Oil and Gas
Law and Taxation 341 at 351 (Southwestern Legal Foundation, 1952).
59. G.C.M. 22106, 1941-1 C.B. 245, as modified by G.C.M. 29094, 1944 C.B. 250.
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interest owned by a taxpayer in each mineral deposit in each
separate tract or parcel of land."
What is a property unit? These can be separated into three
categories as has already been done by at least one writer.6 0
1) Share
This grouping has particular reference to a fractional interest
such as M' etc. A 1942 Board of Tax Appeals decision 6 is authority
for the proposition that generally the land covered by a lease
is a "property" for depletion purposes. However, in G.C.M. 2210612
it is stated that "a single 'tract or parcel' of land may be divided
into two or more separate 'tracts' or 'parcels' by means of the exe-
cution of conveyances or leases carving up the original 'tract or
parcel'...."
Then in G.C.M. 24094: it is stated that a taxpayer repurchasing
a carved out oil payment is acquiring a separate interest, which
does not merge with other interests owned by the taxpayer.
According to this G.C.M.14 if a lease is granted with a usual royal-
ty and A, the lessor, re-acquires the lease the following situation
results:
a) the royalty and lease do not merge
b) the legal character distinguishing a royalty from a lease
is lost; the two interests become identical economic interests
in minerals in place.
The ultimate result of this reasoning is:
a) two separate interests for depletion purposes
b) one interest from an operational standpoint
If there is one interest for purposes of operating the property
then the royalty interest is in effect a working interest and should
bear a working interest's share of operating costs.
Illustration:
Assume a zero cost depletion basis.
A owns % royalty and reacquires the 37 leasehold.
Gross income is $160,000.00
Costs are - ----------- 141,000.00
Net income- ....... $ 19,000.00
Without allocation the depletion provision would be 277 of
Is' of $160,000.00 or $5,500.00
60. Note 58, supra.
61. William H. Cree v. Comm'r., 47 B.T.A. 868(1942), NA 1943 C.B. 29.
62. C.B. 1941-1, pp. 245, 247.
63. 1944 C.B. 250.
64. Ibid.
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With allocation, the depletion would be 50% of net income
as follows:
Royalty interest 34 or $1,187.50
Leasehold interest 76 or 8,312.50
$9,500.00
G.C.M. 22106" and G.C.M. 240946 appear to defy reconciliation
with the Cree6 7 case since under the G.C.M.'s, 8 separate con-
veyances of different working interests would apparently create
more than one property in the same lease.
2) Kind of property
This division has reference to a breakdown into working in-
terest, royalty or oil payments, etc. G.C.M. 2233269 recognized
that two such kinds can be simultaneously acquired in one instru-
ment resulting in two interests. With this, the Tax Court appar-
ently agrees.71
Thus it is quite clear there can be more than one kind of
property in one tract of land, although created by one conveyance
creating a single interest in each property.
3) Area covered
There is authority 7' for saying that each lease as distinguished
from each separate tract is a property unit. The question involved
in this case was whether depletion taken on bonus must be re-
stored if a portion of the property under lease is forfeited and
such forfeited portion is non-contiguous to that retained. By hold-
ing such restoration unnecessary, the court is in effect saying that
the lease and not each separate tract is the basis for determining
a property unit. Your writer is unaware of present Bureau policy
although by virtue of G.C.M. 2210672 previously discussed it will
probably be inclined to insist on restoration. This rests on the
option in the Regulations7" to treat as a single property "two or
more mineral properties .... included in a single tract or parcel
of land."'
74
Contiguous leases conveyed under one instrument constitute
65. Note 62, Supra.
66. Note 63. Supra.
67. Note 61, supra. See also Rialto Mining Corp. Memo op. July 11, 1940 C.C.H. Dec.
11262 (A); Badger Oil Co. v. Comm'r., 118 F.(2d) 791 (5th Cir. 1941) Cert. Den.
314 U.S. 634, rehearing den. 314 U.S. 709.
68. Notes 62 and 63, Supra.
69. 1941-1 C.B. .228.
70. Herndon Drilling Co. v. Comm'r., 6 T.C. 628 (1946).
71. Houston Farms Development Co. v. Comm'r., 194 F.(2d) 520 (5th Cir. 1952).
72. Note 62, Supra.
73. Regulations 118, Section 39.23(m)-i (i).
74. Note 58, Supra.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
one property even though in the assignor's hands, they may consti-
tute separate properties. Tracts may touch at one point or corner
and still not be contiguous. 75  (See Graph 1)
GRAPH 1
DEPLETION ALLOWANCE
BBL Cost BBL Gross Cost
Lease Cost Reserve per BBL Prod. Income Depletion
A -------------- $500,000 1,000,000 $.80 2,000 $40,000 $16,006
B 80------------ 3 0,000 1,000,000 .30 2,000 40,000 6,000
C -------------- 100,000 1,000,000 .40 2,000 40,000 8,000
D ---------- 100,000 1,000,000 .10 2,000 40,000 2,000
Lease Net 50% Net 27%2% Allowable Limit-













C ---- 20,000 20,000 10,000 11,000 10,000 % 50% Net
Income
D ---- 40,000 0 0 11,000 2,000 Cost
CANADIAN OIL AND GAS TAXATION r
In view of increased oil operations in western Canada, particu-
larly in the Leduc Area, and the Williston Basin, we will comment
briefly on the Canadian tax treatment of certain general oil and
gas tax areas.
Acquisition Cost of Leases
Bonus payments are non-depletable capital expenditures and
are included with lease acquisition costs which can be recovered
only through the depletion allowance7-




Costs of Drilling and Exploration
No permission exists in Canadian tax law for an individual to
deduct drilling and exploration costs. Only those specific business'
organizations qualifying under the statute79 appear to be per-
mitted the deduction.
75. Berkshire Oil Co. 9 T.C. 903 (1947).
76. Anyone wishing extensive coverage of Canadian tax treatment of oil and gas trans-
actions, see McDonald, A Comparison of Canadian and United States Tax Treatment of Oil'
and Gas Transactions, Fourth Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 33-381
(Southwest Legal Foundation 1953); Canadian Income Taxation and the Search for Oil in
Canada, 1 Oil and Gas Tax Quarterly 1 (1952).
77. Note 76, supra, 1 Oil and Gas Tax Quarterly 1 at 7 (1952).
78. Note 76, supra, Fourth Annual Institute at 359.
79. Statutes of Canada, 1949, C. 25, Section 53(1)(2) and 1951 C. 51, Section 40 (1).
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Depletion Allowance
An operator is allowed a 331/.. percentage depletion allowance
on profits attributable to oil and gas production after deducting
exploration and drilling costs wherever incurred. 80
This is singularly different from the United States practice of
associating the alowance with a particular property interest.81
A royalty interest is depletable at the rate of 25 per cent.
8 2
OTHER MINERALS
For purposes of analogy we will touch briefly on tax treatment
of comparable problems in other mineral extracting industries.
In an early case,8 3 the Supreme Court held the lessee under
a lease permitting ore extraction owned a property interest by
virtue of the exclusive right to remove the mineral, which proper-
ty interest entitled the lessee to depletion.
The present law provides for varying depletion allowances to
extracting industries concerned with wasting assets. 84 It is inter-
esting to note that timber is also subject to the depletion allow-
ance 5 although, unlike minerals, it does not have the element
of irreplaceability.
"The Property"
G.C.M. 2210686 considers each separate acquisition a separate
property. The tax court apparently disagrees. In The Black Moun-
tain Corp v. Commissioner 7 the facts are:
Taxpayer acquired various coal lands some of which were
grouped for practical operating purposes as Mine No. 30; other
tracts were grouped as Mine No. 31. Taxpayer wished to treat
Mine No. 30 and Mine No. 31 as property units for purposes
of depletion.
The Commissioner felt each separate acquisition was a separate
property.
The Tax Court agreed with the taxpayer stating in effect that
separte acquisitions under proper circumstances could be combined
to form one property.
The Court apparently isn't taking G.C.M.'s88 too seriously. At
80. Note 76, supra, 1 Oil and Gas Tax Quarterly 1 at 15-18.
81. Internal Revenue Code, Section 114 (b) (3).
82. Note 80, supra.
83. Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Company, 267 U.S. 364(1925).
84. Regulation.
85. Regulation 118, Sections 39.23(m)-213 and 39.114-1.
86. Note 62, Supra.
87. 5 T.C. 1117 (1945).
88. G.C.M. 22106, C.B. 1941-1 and G.C.M. 24094, 1944 C.B. 250. See also Note 61,
supra.
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least it seems to analyze each fact situation rather than try and
fit a situation into a particular Bureau ruling. One writer 9 feels
the Court generally is influenced by three factors:
1) intention of the taxpayer
2) consistent treatment or practice by the taxpayer
3) practical purpose or consequence to the taxpayer
Number 3 apparently carried considerable weight in the Black
Mountain case. "
Other Matters
In a recent coal case, Mlorrisdale Coal Company v. Commission-
er9l, the Tax Court strengthened the policy of requiring an eco-
nomic interest to be related to production value.
In this case an independent contractor strip mined. He received
payment based on a certain price per ton mined.
HELD: The independent contractor had no economic interest
so Morrisdale could take full depletion. The court reasoned that
if an economic interest were to exist, payment would be in kind or
at a percentage of ultimate selling price or profit. The indepen-
dent contractor is not assuming any of the risk. However, carrying
this thought too far can have serious consequences to the mining
industry and may in fact, affect the oil and gas field. To illustrate,
the 1952 Tax Court case of J. E. Vincent v. Commissioner"
is a good example. While the complete facts are rather complex
for our purpose we need be concerned with only one issue:
V & W were sole owners of G Company engaged in strip
mining coal. G company was organized with the understand-
ing that V would receive an overriding royalty of 20c per ton
of coal mined (for assigning leases) and W an equal amount
for having made a tipple available to G.
It was agreed formally that V would receive 40c per ton as
rents and royalties, 50% of which he received as trustee for
W pursuant to a declaration of trust.
The Commissioner contended amounts received by V were
not bona fide rents and royalties, that in effect, V and W, sole
owners of G Company, were merely dividing profits. HELD:
no evidence of lack of bona fides. The size of the royalty was
reasonable and in line with industry practice. The portion
attributable to rents should have been allowed G as an ordin-
ary and necessary business expense.
We seem to have a situation where the Court is denying eco-
89. Miller, Oil and Gas Federal Income Taxation, Second Edition (1951) at 89.
90. Note 87, Supra.
91. 19 T.C. 208 (1952).
92. 19 T.C. 501 (1952).
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nomic interest status to an interest because it is payable at a stated
rate per ton mined. Actually the payment is dependent completely
upon production even though not geared to value of production.
If the theory of this case is followed, oil and gas interests based on
a stated rate per barrel of production may also be in danger of los-
ing depletion status.
In fact, the theory is contrary to G.C.M. 22730: wherein an
agreement to pay "a stated sum per unit of mineral extracted and
sold" is deemed payment of production proceeds.
This apparently is an area which needs clearing up and will bear
close watching by the industry.
THE LEASING TRANSACTION
There are several ways for a landowner to realize income in an
oil and gas area.
1) he may sell the land outright.
2) he may grant exploratory rights to an oil company, with or
without option granting the company the privilege of acquir-
ing a lease (with a primary term of 5 to 10 years) on all or a
certain portion of the property. The option is treated as ad-
vance royalty similar to a bonus.
3) He may enter into any one of the various financing arrrange-
ments, to be discussed later, and participate in production.
4) He may retain the surface, assigning the working interest
subject to a retained royalty. This is the usual way.
Pinpointing our locale, let us assume X, fee owner of a section of
land in Divide County in the Williston Basin, leases the entire 640
acres to Y. Both are aware of a strike just across the Canadian
line and anticipate increased activity in Divide County. Since this
might well be considered a "hot" area, X is in the driver's seat and
induces Y to agree to a clause providing that the lease shall be of
no effect unless a well is commenced within 90 days. Had the area
been less active, such a condition would likely be omitted; in lien
thereof is a provision for a one dollar per acre yearly delay rental.
To vary our situation, X may lease to Y for a cash consideration
under an agreement providing that at the end of one year, Y may
select acreage from the entire farm and by making an additional
cash payment extend the lease on the selected :acreage for a term
of years--5 or 10 year primary term-with the dollar per acre de-
lay rental provision. That each of the cash payments should be
treated as a bonus payment " was settled by the 1934 case of
93. 1941-1 C.B. 214.
94. Herring v. Commissioner, 293 U.S. 322 (1934).
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Herring v. Commissioner-5 as being depletable income in the year
of receipt on the theory that it represents advance royalty. 9c X
will report the bonus as ordinary income subject to a deduction for
depletion.17 There are no charges against the bonus so the amount
received is both gross and net income in so far as those terms
affect statutory depletion; the depletion allowable will, therefor be
271%2 of the bonus received. As long as the second cash payment
extends the lease for a period longer than twelve months there
should be no danger of having it confused with a delay rental if
the agreement spells out the provision for subsequent yearly delay
rentals of a specified amount. The rental is purely a payment by
the lessor for the privilege of deferring development. X must in-
clude the rental as ordinary incomeR since it is considered rent99
and is not related to production.100 Y may deduct the delay rental
paid"" or capitalize as additional leasehold costs1' 2 recovering it
through depletion or as a loss on abandonment.
Y will capitalize the bonus as additional cost of the property."' 3
The Regulations," require the operator to adjust his depletion on
deduction on the 7 working interest for the bonus depletion allowed
the royalty holder.
Depletion taken on the bonus must be restored in the year the
lease terminates, whether such termination results from non-pay-
ment of rentals or expiration of the lease prior to production.10
Whether or not a tax benefit resulted is apparently immaterial.
Although the Supreme Court has not passed on the specific point
apparently a slight amount of production prior to abandonment or
forfeiture will eliminate the duty to restore. This is fairly evident
from the decision in Crabb v. Commissioner:1
0 6
1) Taxpayer took depletion on a $15,000 bonus.
2) In the same year he received $13.81 from his % royalty interest.
95. Ibid.
96. Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.S. 299 (1932); Harmel v. Burnet 287 U.S. 103
(1932).
97. Regulations 118, Section 39.23(m)-10 (a).
98. Continental Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 693 (1937).
99. Commissioner v. Wilson, 76 F.(2d) 766 (1935).
100. Sneed v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 1121 modified 33 B.T.A. 478 (1935).
101. G.C.M. 11197, XII-1 C.B. 238 (1933).
102. Internal Revenue Code Section 24(a) (7); Regulations 118, Section 39.24-5.
103. Regulations 118, Section 39.23(m)-10 (a) states:
"... . In the case of the payor any payment made for the acquisition of an economic
interest in a mineral deposit or standing timber constitutes a capital investment in the
property recoverable only through the depletion allowance."
Murphy Oil Company v. Burnet, note 96 supra.
104. Regulations 118, Section 39.23, Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, note 96 supra.
105. Douglas v. Commissioner, 322 U.S. 275 (1944).
106. 41 B.T.A. 686 (1940), acq. 1940-2 C.B.2, aff'd on other issues 119 F.(2d) 772
(5th cir. 1941).
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3) The well was abandoned in the same year. Two years later
the lease was abandoned.
The Board of Tax appeals felt there was production in fact, and
no need to restore depletion.
Likewise partial abandonment by a lessee does not preclude the
possibility of production on the portion not abandoned and is in-
sufficient to require restoration of bonus depletion.1
0 7
If the lease is not terminated or abandoned at the time of les-
sor's death, no restoration is required despite difficulties which
might arise should there be abandonment without production sub-
sequent to lessor's death."os
To complicate our picture slightly, let us assume the bonus is
paid in installments of either a fixed sum or in a series of periodic
payments and payment is secured by a mortgage on other prop-
erty. X is on the cash basis so the bonus is depletable only when
actually or constructively received. The mere fact of deferment
does not change the essential character of a bonus as depletable.
Likewise, its depletable character is not altered though payable
absolutely.. This type of situation is best illustrated by the Kle-
berg case."'
Mrs. Kleberg leased a tract to Humble for 20 years under a
lease providing for the usual M royalty plus $3,757.07 annual pay-
ment. In lieu of the annual payments, Mrs. Kleberg chose to
accept a discounted value of $49,313.83. This was to be paid in
two installments of $24,656.92 each during the first two years of
the lease.
Held: The payment of $24,656.92 was a bonus in the nature of
advance royalties.
Another variation would be to have the delay rentals geared to
a certain area, for example a certain quarter section. Once a well
is drilled in that specific area, no further delay rental payments are
due on that quarter section. Remaining acreage under lease may
be forfeited if desired or retained by appropriate rental payments.
X, of course, also will take depletion on production related to
his 3% royalty. The lessee excludes the lessor's 6 royalty from his
gross income on which he is allowed depletion. Assuming that Y
sub-leased to Z, reserving a 1/16 or some other fractional royalty,
this additional royalty will be considered an overriding royalty sub-
ject to the same tax considerations as was the original 3 royalty re-
served by X.
107. Driscoll v. Commissioner, 147 F.(2d) 493 (5th cir. 1941).
108. Seeligson v. Commissioner, 141 F.(2d) 358 (5th cir. 1944).
109. 43 B.T.A. 277 (1941), acq. 1941-1 C.B. 6.
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There might be a minimum royalty provision under which X
would get a royalty of "x" dollars. The portion received by X as
representing his share in current production will be treated as
ordinary royalty and the excess as lease installment bonus. Both
items are depletable. If the excess can not be applied in reducing
future years royalty payments and a forfeiture occurs, the excess
may be considered a rental paid for continued use of the
property."' 0
As can be noted from the foregoing illustrations, there are in-
numerable ways of varying the lease provisions, depending on
among other things, custom in a given area, potential production,
and desired tax treatment.
Sale v. Lease
Whether a transaction results in a sale or a lease under Federal
income tax law may well hinge solely on the skill of the drafts-
man. It is obviously important since cash received may receive
capital gain treatment if a sale results whereas it will be considered
bonus subject to depletion if a lease is effected. Ample authority
for determining the question under the Internal Revenue Code
rather than according to state law is found in such leading cases
as Burnet v. Harmel,111 Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Commis-
sioner,112 and Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner."'
In Cullen v. Commissioner,-4 the influence played by the nature
of the interest retained is clearly evident. In this 1941 case tax-
payer assigned leases to Humble Oil & Refining Co. for a cash con-
sideration and an oil payment retaining an overriding royalty in three
of the 12 leases. On appeal to the fifth circuit, the Board of Tax
Appeal was overruled in its holding that the transaction was a
sublease in its entirety. The Circuit Court felt the transaction was
a sale as to the nine leases.
While we are reasonably safe in saying the nature of the re-
tained interest is of prime importance, recent cases indicate the
courts are giving serious consideration to a number of different
factors in determining the question.
Two recent cases evidencing this attitude are West v. Commis-
sioner"' and Trembly v. Commissioner."' Each situation involved
110. I.T. 3401, 1940-2 C.B. 166; Continental Oil Co., 36 B.T.A. 693 (1937).
111. Note 96, supra.
112. 287 U.S. 308 (1932).
113. Note 35, supra.
114. 118 F(2d) 651 (5th cir.'1941).
115. 150 F.(2d) 723 (5th cir. 1945).
116. 7 T.C.M. 972 (1948).
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elements of both a lease and a sale. Thus the Courts were practi-
cally forced into setting definite rules or to discuss several factors
and then determine which elements were paramount. This latter
procedure which was followed leaves the door open to swing either
way in the future.
The West case involved a conveyance of two leases, the surface
and minerals for a cash consideration. By a supplemental agree-
ment, taxpayer's only remedy in the case of breach of the agree-
ment was for damages. The agreement provided that no reversion-
ary interest was retained by the taxpayer lessor.
The Tax Court in a lengthy opinion felt more lease elements
were present even though the agreement was not clearly either a
sale or a lease. The absence of a forfeiture was held not controlling
even though customarily present in a leasing agreement.
Then in the Trembly case the court following its reasoning
methods adopted in the West case came to an opposite conclusion.
Taxpayer assigned sulphur rights for:
1) cash of $2,000 per acre.
2) reserving a royalty of $1.60 per long ton of sulphur
The assignee was expressly exempted from drilling for sulphur.
The Court held a sale resulted.
It seems evident that the Trembly case weakens the rule of the
Cullen' 1 case regarding the importance of the nature of the interest
retained.
In fact, the Tax Court" 8 and the Court of Appeals'" each have
stated that the facts and circumstances determine whether a lease
or a sale results. Some of these factors are: 120
1. forfeiture clause
2. collateral agreement
3. intent of the parties
4. type of interest retained
5. development requirements
An even more recent case on this subject is Arthur E. Moreton
v. Commissioner. 121 In theory it apparently lends support to
the predominant purpose approach established in the West and
Trembly cases.
The facts are:
Petitioners in 1947 conveyed a mining claim to Columbia Iron
117. Note 114, supra.
118. Note 116, supra.
119. Note 115, supra.
120. Oil and Gas Federal Income Tax Manual, 7th Ed. 1953, Arthur Anderson & Co.
121. 11 T.C.M. 478 (1952), (Comm'r's. appeal withdrawn, 1953).
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Mining Company reserving for thirty years the mineral rights in
and the right to mine all iron ore in the claim in excess of one
million gross tons. Petitioners were not engaged in the mining
business. Columbia could mine the ore reserved by petitioners
if it paid 25c a ton to petitioners.
No obligatory mining or delevoping provision was in the
agreement. Estimates indicated only a million tons of commer-
cial ore existed.
Query: Sale or lease?
Commissioner: The reservation in effect precludes it from being
a sale.
Held: A sale because the absence of a developing provision
plus the estimated commercial ore indicate the purpose of the
contract was other than development. Further, a reservation
doesn't prevent the transaction from being a sale.
This case and the Trembly122 case consider the development obli-
gations fairly strong evidence of the predominate purpose. Of
couse in the Trembly case the court was influenced by the rela-
tively high cash payment and in the Moreton case by the fact that
the reserved interest was nominal in view of the estimated quan-
tity of commercial ore. The fact remains, however, the court seems
to be at odds with the Bureau on the importance of development.
In G.C.M. 27322123 the Bureau states the theory of these decis-
ions varies from the controlling decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States. This ruling states the Bureau policy to be that
the purpose and intent of the parties does not determine tax treat-
ment and that a lump sum payment received by a grantor of a
mineral right in connection with the retention by him of a royalty
interest will be treated as ordinary income and not as proceeds
from the sale of a capital asset.
Apparently the G.C.M. is an effort by the Bureau to stress en-
couraging characterizing a transaction as a lease or a sale depend-
ing on the type of interest retained. This is an area which will bear
close watching.
Exchange of Oil Properties.
The tax-question involved in exchanges is whether a non-taxable
exchange under Section 112(b) (1)124 of the Internal Revenue
122. Note 116, supra.
,123. I.R.B. No. 19, September 15, 1952.
124. Section 112 Recognition of Gain or Loss
"(b) Exchanges Solely in Kind.
(1) Property held for productive use or investment.-No gain or loss shall
be recognized if property held for productive use in trade or business
or for investment (not including stock in trade or other property held
primarily for sale, nor stocks, bonds, notes, choses in action, certifi-
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Code has resulted. The basic factors 'surrounding exchanges of
property generally also apply -to exchanges of oil and gas property;
we have merely to see whether a certain type situation falls within
or without the ambit of the pertinent Code Section.
125
For example, the exchange of an! oil payment for an overriding
royalty has been held an exchange of unlike property and there-
for taxable.126  The Court relied on two points of dissimilarity
which it pointed out as follows:
(1) the oil payment was limited in amount while the royalty was
perpetual; and
(2) the oil payment was payable out of a fraction of produc-
tion larger than that out of which the royalty was to be paid.
(4/8 as against X of %)
The court apparently felt these two differences were so sub-
stantial as to deny application of the tax saving features of. section
112(b) (1) even though admitting the two interests have many
similarities, and so indicated in language as follows:
"While we agree with petitioner that there are some points of
similarity between the Holmans oil payment and the Dawson
overriding royalty, the differences which we have pointed. out
are so substantial that we do not think the exchange in quetsion
falls within the provisions of Section 112(b) (1) ."117
Relying on the Midfield case, the Board in 1942128 held an ex-
change of an oil payment for a working interest taxable.
A landmark case in the area of exchange of oil properties is the
Board of Tax Appeals case of Crichton v. Commissioner.12 9 In this
case a mother and children owned undivided interests in unim-
proved rural land and also in a hotel (improved city land). The
children transferred their interest in the hotel to their mother in
exchange for an interest in the minerals in the country property.
Although the government relied on the Midfield case again,13° no
doubt on the theory there is more similarity between an oil pay-
ment and an overriding royalty than there is between a hotel and
a mineral interest, the Board was sustained by the Fifth Circuit
in holding the exchange involved property of a "like kind."' 3'
cates of trust or beneficial interest, or other securities or evidences of
indebtedness or interest) is exchanged solely for property of a like
kind to be held either for productive use in trade or, business or or
investment."
125. Note 1, supra.
126. Midfield Oil Company v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 1154 (1939).
127. Note 1]26, Supra, at p. 1158.
128. Kay Kimball v. Comm'r., 41 B.T.A. 940 (1940).
129. 122 F.(2d) 181, (5th cir. 1941).
130. Note 126, supra.
131. Note 129, .supra.
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The Bureau non-acquiesced."1 -' The case is contrary to Bureau
thinking for several preceding years and represents a lone exception
to the Commissioner's success in attacking supposed tax free ex-
changes involving oil properties. In reaching its decision the court
made certain statements worth noting even though we may be un-
able to telescope their implications. The court stated:
... the regulations and the interpretations under it, leave
no doubt that no gain or loss is realized by one other than a
dealer, from an exchange of real estate for other real estate and
that the distinction intended and made by the state is the broad
one between classes and character of property, for in-
stance between real and personal property. It was not intended
to draw any distinction between parcels of real property how-
ever dissimilar they may be in location, in attributes,
and in capacities for profitable use." (emphasis supplied.
The two cases seem irreconcilable even though we consider the
character of an oil payment and compare with language used by
the court. Treatment of an oil payment as something other than
real property because of limited duration clarifies the issue slightly.
In a Tax Court memo decision"' decided October 18, 1951,
the court held taxable an exchange of an improved leasehold for
an oil payment. We thus have a series of cases resulting in taxable
exchanges where one of the exchanged interests was an oil pay-
ment. A case recently appealed to the Fifth Circuit 1 4 may change
the picture. It emphasizes the distinction as being between classes
of property. This case involved an exchange of an overriding royalty
and mineral interest limited to the time necessary to put a certain
value in oil for the fee interest in certain minerals.
The facts are:
1) F owned the fee in oil, gas and other minerals.
2) F exchanged this fee for an overriding royalty and mineral
interest in other oil property limited to the time when he would
net $43,000 worth of oil.
3) F treated the transaction as a non-taxable exchange of like
properties.
Although the Commissioner attempted to draw a distinction on the
basis of duration of the interest in that the fee was unlimited,
the Court reiterated the Crichton doctrine which in effect is that
two interests in land are properties of a like kind for purposes of
132. 1940-2 C.B. 23.
133. Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Comm'r., 10 T.C.M. 999 (Memo op) (October 18,
1951).
134. Fleming v. Campbell, 205 F.(2d) 551 (1953).
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Section 112 (b) (1) even though one is definite and the other
indefinite.13"
The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn is that an
oil payment not lasting for the life of the property is not considered
as real estate for purposes of § 112 (b) (1). However, except for the
limited duration, an oil payment is as much an interest in produc-
tion as a royalty or in fact a working interest. The difficulties en-
countered in exchanging an oil payment seem difficult to avoid-
by avoiding the limitation, in effect a royalty results. Perhaps there-
in lies the solution, if it can be squared with the practical business
realities of the transaction.
Assuming a non-taxable exchange is effected, the basis of prop-
erty received is the same as that parted with. If boot results in a
taxable gain, the basis is the same as that parted with reduced
by cash received by the transferor and the amount of liability
assumed by transferee or to which the property transferred was
subject."'
If an exchange is non-taxable except for the boot received
either in cash or other property the gain is taxable to the extent
of the value of the boot. 3 - For example, a working interest with a
basis of $100,000 is exchanged for a working interest with a basis
$80,000 and $30,000 cash. The gain is $10,000 fully taxable. Thus
property, which, were it the only consideration, would render the
exchange non-taxable is taken into consideration in computing the
gain. Similarly, under a Section 112 (b) (1) exchange an assump-
tion of a liability of one party by another is treated as boot by
the first party.
Obligation Wells
Quite frequently A, owner of the full working interest is unable
to finance the drilling of a well. He may, therefor, assign a
fractional working interest to X, in consideration of X's drilling
the first well free of cost to A. This obligation well, is also known
as a free well.
X may deduct intangible drilling and development costs in con-
nection with drilling the obligation well.138 On the other hand,
at this point, A has incurred no taxable income-the value of his
interest has appreciated.1 9 However, X may deduct only that
135. Cf. Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Comm'r., 10 T.C.M. 999 holding a limited oil
payment is unlike an overriding royalty of indefinite duration.
136. Internal Revenue Code, Section 113 (a) (6).
137. Ibid. Section 11 2 (c) (1).
138. Regulations 118, Section 39.23(m)-16 (b) (1) (i).
139. S.M. 3322, IV-1 C.B. 112; C.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214.
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portion applicable to his fractional interest.14 ° The remaining
intangible drilling and development costs must be capitalized
as costs of the leasehold and returned through the depletion al-
lowance. Subsequently if a dry bole results, the capitalized por-
tion of intangibles may be deducted as a loss, upon proof of
worthlessness.' 4'
Assume the following:
(a) A is leasehold owner-B is drilling the free well.
(b) Intangible drilling and developments costs are $10,000.
Situations:
1. A assigns full working interest to B, reserving a fractional :net
profits interest.
2. A assigns 50% of the working interest to B.





Capitalize Option Capitalize Option
1. - - - $10,000
2. - - $ 5,000 5,000
3. - - 10,000 -
Interest for Services
Often, an interest in oil properties is received in payment for
services rendered. The party receiving such property realizes in-
corne to the extent of its value at date of receipt if the services
are not related to developing the property of which tae interest is
a part. If such relationship exists this value then becomes the tax
basis of the interest acquired. 4 2 A 1945 tax court case' illustrates
quite clearly its application to a lawyer who received 32 of his
client's royalty interest for successfully concluding his claim to a
royalty interest. The case was taken on a contingency fee basis.
The lawyer was required to include the value of the royalty at
assignment date.
However, no taxable income is received where as in the case of
geologists, well drillers, and others performing services having the
same relation, to the property, the services are performed in con-
nection with exploration or development of property in which the
particular interest is assigned.'
-
4
140. Regulations 118, Section 39.23 (m)-16 (b) (1).
141. G.C.M. 3890, C.B. VII-1, 168 (1928).
142. Schermerhorn Oil Corp. 46 B.T.A. 151 (1942).
143. Leland J. Allen 5 T.C. 1232 (1945).
144. Comm'r. v. Edwards Drilling Co. 95 F.(2d) 719 (5th 1938); G.C.M. 22730,
C.B. 1941-1, 214; Hugh Hodges Drilling Co. 43 B.T.A. 1045 (1941); See G.C.M.
1 248.
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These interests represent additional leasehold costs as far as the
operator is concerned. In order for the recipient to use the deple-




In general, these statements are true whether the interest re-
ceived is a net profits, carried interest, or a fractional oil pay-
ment.'46
FINANCING
Dry Hole and Bottom Hole Contributions14
These contributions arise in the following manner:
A and B each own an oil and gas lease on land in the same area.
Their relationship in location is such that the proving of existence
or non-existence of oil in the area covered by A's lease will affect
the lease held by B. B consequently agrees to contribute a portion
of the drilling costs incurred by A in drlling a test well. If B's
contribution is payable only in the event of a dry hole, it is known
as a dry hole contribution. If it is payable in any and all events
when bottom or a certain depth is reached, it is known as a bot-
tom hole contribution.
Tax consequences:
If A has elected to capitalize intangible drilling and develop-
ment costs, the contribution should be apportioned between de-
pletable and depreciable costs, thereby reducing them.
If A expenses, ID and D costs, and a producer results, the con-
tribution should be apportioned between tangible and intangible
costs incurred in reaching the required depth, thereby reducing
them. If a dry hole results, the contribution will reduce the
ordinary loss resulting from the dry hole.
Oil Payments
An oil payment may be defined as the right to receive an amount,
expressed as a stated number of barrels of oil or a stated sum of
money from a certain percentage of oil production. Unless the
holder thereof must look solely to production for pay out, it is not
in fact a true oil payment.14 8 This is apparently based on the pre-
mise that the "economic interest" element is missing when pay-
22332, 1941-1 C.B. 228 (1941) regarding receipt by a drilling contractor of an oil
payment and other interest plus cash.
145. See Southwest Exploration Co. 18 T.C. 961 (1952). Van Slyke Jr. Adm. v.
Glem, 107 F. Supp. 229 (D.C. Minn. 1952) holding royalties received in exchange for
services were economic interests and assignment of same for a four year period was not
an assignment of income.
146. Regulations 118, Section 39.22 (a)-3; Boudreau v. Comm'r., 134 F.(2d) 360
(5th cir. 1943).
.147. See Miller, Oil and Gas Federal Income Taxation, Second Edition, (1951) pp.
235-237.
148. Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940).
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ment must be made in any event. Under the Thomas v. Perkins14
decision, oil payment proceeds are subject to depletion as is any
royalty. Thus, under the doctrine of Palmer v. Bender,5 ' the ex-
istence of an economic interest element is essential.
It is apparently immaterial in what manner the oil payment is
acquired, providing it qualifies as an economic interest."'
Oil payments or production payments as they are sometimes
called, may be separated into three main types.
1) Retained. In this situation, the payment. retained is the as-
signor's interest after assignment.
2) Carved-Out. This type payment arises when an oil payment
is carved out of a larger interest, the assignor retaining the balance
of the interest out of which the payment is payable.
The Bureau at the present time does not distinguish between
long or short-lived production payments. It holds by a 1950 rul-
ing1 2 that any carved out production payment results in ordinary
income to the assignor. G.C.M. 2484915' held that assignment of a
short-lived carved out production payment represents the assign-
ment of a right, to future income. The fact that the production
payment in hands of the assignee might represent a property in-
terest does not change the picture.
3) Sharing type payment. This payment, used to foster ex-
ploration and development of the property arises when a portion of
the minerals to be produced are assigned as consideration for ser-
vices which may be development.
As can be readily noted, this usually results in' placing the
assignee in the position of sharing the risks since he can look only
to possible production for compensation for whatever services he
performed.
Situations resulting in the sharing type may be illustrated as
follows:
a. Lawyer for legal services
b. Geologist for exploration work
c. Drilling contractor for drilling the well
d. Supplier for furnishing equipment.
The assignee's basis, in the payment, for cost depletion purposes
1.49. 301 U.S. 655 (1937).
150. 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
151. T. W. Lee v. Comm'r., 42 B.T.A. 1217 (5th cir. 1942) aff'd. 126 F.(2d) 825.
152. 1. T. 4003, 1950-1 C.B. 10.
153. 1946-1 C.B. 66.
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would be the value of the services or equipment furnished. No in-
come is realized by the assignee from the assignment.
Examples of No. 3 above are well illustrated by the Hugh
Hodges5 4 case and the Herndon Drilling Co.'55 case. In each of
these, the court considered the payment an economic interest and
the costs expended therefor returnable only through depletion.
The assignor will exclude from his income amounts paid to the
holder of the oil payment.
In order to avoid having the payment considered income to
the extent of its fair market value at time of the assignment, the
services must be related to the property from which the payment
is assigned.
In addition to the problem of making sure the payment pro-
vided for is in fact a true oil payment, there are several other pit-
falls for which the wary should watch. Two of these are:
1) An oil payment so large that it probably will not pay out
may be treated as royalty.
This problem can be more easily pictured if we assume that A,
lessee, wants to dispose of his lease, retain a continuing interest in
production and also get capital gain treatment on the cash con-
sideration. Obviously, if a royalty is retained, A retains a continu-
ing economic interest, has subleased the property and treats the
cash as though it were bonus.
On the other hand, if A can secure a large oil payment and have
it so considered, he may take capital gains treatment on the cash
consideration.
It is fairly evident that if the size of the oil payment bears no
relation to estimated reserves and the arrangement is purely an
attempt to secure capital gains treatment on what otherwise would
be bonus money, the payout may be considered a royalty. The old
rule of form v. substance may come into play.
It would thus seem advisable either to obtain a Bureau ruling
since it is not uncommon to discover additional reserves which will
enable the oil payment to easily pay out, or to keep it within a
reasonable figure.
2) Treatment of sale of oil or gas payment carved out ofa larger retained interest as anticipation of income.
G.C.M. 24849156 states that the assignment of a short-lived "in-
oil" payment right, carved out of any type of depletable interest
154. Hugh Hodges Drilling Co. v. Comm'r., 43 B.T.A. 1045 (1941).
155. Herndon Drilling Co. v. Comm'r., 6 T.C. 628 (1946) NA 1946-2 C.B. 6.
156. Note 153, supra.
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in oil and gas in place results in ordinary income unless pledged
for use in future development. Subsequently I.T. 400315 was issued
which states that "there is no distinction between short-lived and
long-lived in-oil payment rights."
Thus, unless the oil payment represents the assignor's entire
interest, consideration received for an in-oil payment not pledged
for development and extending for less than the life of the deple-
table property from which carved is merely an assignment of in-
come. Prior to issuance of I.T. 4003, the Bureau had stated in I.T.
3 93 5 118 that a gift of a carved-out oil payment interest was income
of the donor-if and when it arises. The philosophy behind this
treatment seems to be bottomed on the Helvering v. Horst'59 dis-
tinction between selling the fruit from the tree or the tree itself.
The above philosophy apparently applies only to situations where
the sale is of a payment carved out of a larger interest. Thus, an
oil payment sold outright even though originally reserved out of a
working interest previously disposed may be considered as income
anticipation. On the other hand, a vertical slicing of the oil payment
rather than a horizontal one should assure capital gains treatment.
A situation which might well be avoided is that requiring the
holder of a working interest to capitalize operating costs and in-
tangible drilling and development costs. This could happen if the
oil or gas payment is payable out of 100% of the gross income at-
tributable on the theory that the holder of the working interest is
building up his equity by such expenditlires. This will then be-
come an economic interest once the oil payment is paid off.
• Similarly, care should be taken in drafting an agreement provid-
ing for paying an oil payment out of net profits. The burdens.
which might change the payment into a working interest should not
be attributable to the holder of the oil payment.
Assignments
. Quite frequently an individual holding the working interest does
not have adequate financial resources justifying gambling the
benefits of potential production against the risks involved in sink-
ing a wildcat. This has resulted in devising methods of shifting the
risk to others, yet assuring an interest in any discovery.. Subse-
quent to the original leasing transaction, X, holder of the 78' work-
ing interest may decide to. sell his interest outright. Since this
interest is real property used in a. trade or: business, he can refer
157, Note 152, supra.
158. 1949-1 C.B. 39.
159. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
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to Section 117j and report capital gain treatment, assuming the
holding period and the purpose for which the property is held
meet requirements of Section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code.
As indicated in our sale and lease discussion, a perplexing prob-
lem, one which is important taxwise, may arise in determining
whether the transaction results, for federal income tax purposes,
in a sale or a lease. To decide this issue we turn to federal in-
come tax law and not to the local law61° governing property
transactions. We are perhaps justified in saying that the distinction
may turn on whether the assignor retains a continuous interest in
production as part of the consideration, with the economic realities
of each assignment determining its classification."t
Whether the economic interest sold is a royalty, oil payment or a
working interest, the conveyance. must be unlimited and unquali-
fied by a reversion to the assignor.' 2
Farm Out
There are two basic types of farm outs, to wit:
1) Palmer v. Bender assignment""3
This simply involves a conveyance by the lessee of the entire
leasehold for cash with an overriding royalty reservation in what-
ever fraction desired. Their respective interests may then be as
follows:
original lessor --------------------------
original lessee (assignor) assume
assignee -- 6/8
In this type situation, the lessee has retained an interest con-
tinuing for the life of the property and thus has subleased rather
than sold the property.
Some of the more basic tax effects of this subleasing arrangement
are as follows:
a. The cash consideration is depletable.
b. The overriding royalty is subject to depletion'"' just as is the
the original royalty reserved by the original lessor.
c. The assignee is substituted for the original lessee. His 6/8
of production is also subject to depletion. His interest is
burdened with the cost of production. His intangible dril-
ling and developing expenses may be expensed, if a proper
election is made.
160. Driscoll v. Comm'r., 147 F.(2d) 493 (5th cir. 1945); note 111, supra.
161. G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214, note 26 and 27 at 484.
162. See our discussion on oil payments regarding the effects -of a vertical carving.
163. Palmer v. Bender, note 150, supra.
164. Ibid.
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Economic aspects:
a. Two interests will share in ultimate production with no risk
involved.
b. The interests of all three parties are subject to depletion.
c. The working interest of the assignee, though reduced to 6/8
is burdened with full costs.
QUAERE: If depletion is based on the premise that it induces
expenditure in a high risk area, what foundation is
there for allowing depletion for the non-risk
interests?
2) Fleming type assignment"0 5
In this assignment, the assignor conveys for cash plus a reserved
in-oil payment of X dollars payable out of a specified fraction of
oil and gas, if and when produced. It is evident that the assignor's
retained economic interest may not extend over the life of the
property. This fact even though such oil payment is in effect a
limited overriding royalty prevents the transaction from being con-
sidered a lease. The distinction seems to turn on whether the re-
tained interest may or must extend over the life of the property.
Some of the basic tax effects of this assignment are:
a. The oil payment is subject to depletion, just as if it were an
override,"'0
b. Again the assignee, with the interest burdened with costs
of production, takes depletion only on his fractional interest.
c. The assignor does not take depletion on the cash payment.
When accompanied by an override limited in amount, the
cash is treated as purchase money and is subject to capital
gains treatment.
67
Thus we have a transaction essentially similar to the Palmer v.
Bender assignment, except for the fact that the reserved interest
may not extend over the life of the property.
Both these assignments may occur from the same transaction as
is evident from Cullem v. Comm'r.,"5 where several leases were
transferred as a unit for cash and an oil payment. In addition an
override was retained on part of the leases. The court held the
transaction divisible, both a sale and a lease resulting.
Carried Interest
A situation involving this type interest may arise if A assigns the
lease to B who henceforth is known as the "operator." The opera-
165. Comm'r. v. Fleming, 82 F.(2d) 324 (5th Cir. 1936).
166. Thomas v. Perkins, note 149, supra; Ortiz Oil Co. v. Comm'r., 37 B.T.A. 156
(1938), aff'd. 102 F.(2d) 508 (5th Cir. 1939); cert. den. 308 U.S. 559 (1939).
167. Note 165, supra; Columbia Oil & Gas Co. v. Comm'r., 118 F.(2d) 459
(5th 1941); Hogan v. Commr., 141 F.(2d) 92 (5th Cir. 1944).
168. Note 114,supra.
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tor agree to advance all costs and expenses to drill as many wells
as is contemplated in the agreement. A is the Carried Party.
B will recoup his costs only from the carried party's share of oil
produced, and is entitled to the full income from the property until
such costs are returned. At the end of the pay out period, the two
parties usually become joint operators of an undivided working
interest and share in whatever fraction desired. During the pay
out period, the assignor has no personal liability for any of the costs,
the assignee having to look solely to production for recoupment.
Originally, it was held that the carried party was taxable on the
income attributable to his interest since it was applied against costs
of his interest. 69
Subsequently, the Bureau published a ruling,17° the gist of which
is contra to the Reynolds case."' It stated that the carrying party
has the benefit of the intangible deduction and is taxed on all the
income, including the carried -party's share being offset against
the cost, until a pay out stage is reached.
The Supreme Court cases of Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commis-
sioner171 and Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner"13 considered
the right to share net income as a depletable economic interest,
rather than an economic advantage, as was done in previous cases l1 4
and in a Bureau publication.' This involves a slight variation of
the usual carried interest type arrangement and in effect carries us
into the net profits area. We will thus discuss this further when we
pick up the net profits type transaction.
In 1947 the Abercrombie case 171 came down, holding the as-
signee not taxable on income used to pay development costs. In
effect it was agreeing with the Reynolds case.
In 1949 an acquiesence in the Abercrombie case was published.177
Shortly thereafter, the Bureau published the opinion of the fifth
circuit.178
We thus had the anomalous situation of the Bureau sanctioning
169. Reynolds v. McMurray, 60 F.(2d) 843 (10th Cir. 1932), cert. den 287 U.S.
664.
170. G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214.
171. Note 169, supra.
172. 326 U.S. 599 (1946) (1946-1 C.B. 69).
173. 328 U.S4 25 (1946) (1946-1 C.B. 237).
174. Elbe Oil Land Development Co. v. Comm'r., 303 U.S. 372 (1938); O'Donnell
v. Helvering, 303 U.S. 370 (1938).
175. G.C.M. 22730, note 170, supra.
176. J. S. Abercrombie, 162 F.(2d) 338 (5th Cir. 1947) aff'g. 7 T.C. 120.
177. 1949-1 C.B. 1, withdrawing NA 1946-2 C.B. 61.
178. 1949-1 C.B. 37. Such publication should indicate acceptance though not
necessarily approval.
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the Abercrombie case without either h-ving revoked or modified
G.C.M. 22730.179
This series of inconsistent actions has created an area of confus-
ion and uncertainty in the carried interest arrangement sharing net
income. However, as in other situations where inconsistent tax
treatment or consistent tax treatment accompanied by inconsistent
reasoning haunts the tax man and his client, means can be often
found to at least decrease the uncertainty.
Bearing in mind the features of the contract in the Abercrombie
situation, we want to draw an instrument substantially different,
and create a Manahan situation.' 80 To do so we assign all the
interest in the lease, whether that be the entire lease or only a
fractional interest. The assignee will then have all the oil and gas
in place and own the lease until he has produced sufficient oil to
offset costs incurred. The assignor has no immediate interest. He
has a reversion.
If the lease proves worthless, A and B may each deduct his entire
capital cost in the lease.
If the lease is productive, A is not taxed upon the reversion of
an interest to him when he recovers his costs of development and
operating.
After the pay out period, A and B, as joint operators share the
income in whatever proportioa desired. The deduction for intan-
gible drilling and development costs and for operating cost will be
in proportion to their respective working interest.
Thus even though the Bureau may follow G.C.M. 2273081 as
.modified by Kirby' 8 2 and Burton-Sutton's 3 unless the facts coincide
with Abercrombie, a Manahan fact situation will tend to emphasize
a non-Abercrombie arrangement and assure G.C.M. treatment.
NET PROFITS
In this type assignment the lessee transfers hs entire interest. The
assignee contractually obligates himself to develop the property
and pay operating costs. He further agrees to pay the assignor a
fractional part of the net profits. The assignee thus operates the
properties free of any restriction from the assignor, with the only
170. Note 170, supra
180. Manahan Oil Co. v. Comm'r., 8 T.C. 1159 (1947); See also Hughes Drilling
Co., note 154, supra, and Herndon Drilling Co., case, note 155, supra.
181. Note 170, supra.
182. Note 173, supra.
183. Note 173, supra.
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obligation of accounting to the assignor for his share of the net
profits in accordance with the contract.
As indicated in the foregoing discussion on carried interests,
this involves only a slight variation over that arrangement. This
is the area in which the courts attempted to distinguish between
economic advantage and economic interest holding originally that
such an arrangement produced only an advantage. Consequently
no depletion was allowed on either the net profits or on any cash
which formed part of the consideration." 4
The confusion resulting from this situation was corrected in 1946
wvhen the court in two cases' reviewed the net profits contract
and laid down rules which put to rest the economic advantage
idea. Because of this, the net profits contract has a comparative
tax certainty-one of its most favorable factors.
By virtue of these cases the assignee is allowed depletion on
his gross income, represented by the income remaining after sub-
tracting the net profits interest of the assignor. He can take all
allowable deductions, including the entire deduction for intangibles
and operating costs and depreciation on all the equipment.
The cash received by assignor for his net profits is to be treated
as royalty and subject to depletion. Thus, the court in effect held
that the assignor had, by way of net profits, retained an economic
interest in the oil and gas in place and thus had sub-leased rather
than sold the lease.
Under the Abercrombie situation, each party is taxed his share
of gross income. There is some confusion here with relation to when
the carried party has a right to deduct intangible drilling and
development costs and operating costs. Since the court character-
izes the arrangement as a loan, this is really not a true carried
situation and it may be the repayment contingency must be re-
moved first."" ' A similar question exists with respect to depreciation.
Whether the Crane case187 will permit deduction prior to removal
of the repayment contingency is problematical.
There is some indication that the doctrine of the Kirby and
Burton-Sutton cases may be extended to cover more complicated
situations where a determination that the net profits interest is
184. Note 174, supra.
185. Notes 172, 173, supra.
186. See Sunburst Oil & Refining Co.. 23 B.T.A. 829 (1931).
187. Crane v. Comnm'r., 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
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derived solely from reservation of an interest in minerals is not
as clear as in the cited cases."'l
For example, assume a situation where refining operations enter
the picture. The "net profits" paid the assignor may include profits
from such operations. To treat such a payment as production pay-
ment would require the application of considerable imagination.
At present the full extent of this anticipated extension of this
doctrine can not be determined. To illustrate the situation let us
look at the case of Roeser v. Pendleton, Inc.' " in which the facts
are as follows:
1) Taxpayer drilled wells under a contract providing for
immediate payment of out-of-pocket expense.
2) Deferment of the balance of the contract price until the
owner recovered other costs.
3) After (1) and (2) taxpayer would receive remainder of
contract price "in an amount not less than 501/( of operator's
net income" from the leases involved.
Although taxpayer felt he had a depletable interest in production
the Court said "no" since payments were not to be solely out of
production but gauged by lease itet income.
In the same year, we have the case of Gray v. Commissioner'"'
with facts substantially as follows:
Taxpayer assigned a lease, reserving:
1) '/-j overriding oil royalty.
2) 20. net profit payment in gas.
3) right to 20% of the stock in any corporation which assignee
might form to operate a cycling plant.
In deciding the case, the Court considered the contingent interest
in any future cycling plant as one of the determining factors re-
serving to the taxpayer as an economic interest. The sole question
was whether cash received was depletable or proceeds from the
sale of capital assets. Reasoning as above, the Court decided that
the taxpayer having an economic interest received income subject
to depletion.
A more recent case which serves to confuse the issue is that of
Carl B. Tuttle v. U.S.1 1
1 ) In 1941, taxpayer owned 150 shares of Weber Oil Co. stock.
He and other shareholders sold all stock to the Ohio Oil Co.
188. See Winstead, Carried Interest and Net Profits Interest, Second Annual Insti-
tnte on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation, (Southwestern Legal Foundation, 1951).
189. 15 T.C. 966 (1950).
190. 183 F.(2d) 329 (5th Cir. 1950) aff'g. 13 T.C. 265.
191. 101 F. Supp. 532 (1951).
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2) The consideration consisted of:
a) 1 million cash to be paid within 12 months.
b) An oil payment of 34 of gross proceeds of oil produced
and marketed from certain designated existing leases of
the Weber Co. until such payments totaled 3 million
dollars.
c) A ir overriding royalty (unlimited in time and amount)
from gross proceeds from oil produced and marketed
from the same leases. This would ripen as soon as the
oil payment paid out.
3) Ohio Oil Co. would dissolve Weber Oil Co. and assign all
rights under the contract to a designated agent for the
shareholders of Weber Oil, which agent would make pay-
ments to the shareholders.
4) Taxpayer made a profit on the stock sale, and paid a capital
gains rate tax in 1941 on the profit included in cash receiv-
ed and on estimated future receipts from the oil payment.
5) In years 1942-1945, taxpayer received oil payment payments
in excess of the estimated amounts included in 1941 tax
return. He contends these are capital gains. The govern-
ment contends he has an interest in production and such
receipts are subject to depletion.
HELD: The receipts are taxed at capital gains rate.
While the Court relies on the Haynes' case it apparently over-
looks one pertinent factual difference which significantly distin-
guishes the two. In Tuttle a binding contract providing for the
actual transfer to the Weber shareholders of economic interests was
effected. Thus, there seems no legitimate reason for in effect
saying that the proceeds are proceeds from the sale of stock re-
gardless of source resulting in a "measured by" situation.
50-50 CONTRACT
This type assignment arises from a transfer of a fractional inter-
est in the lease for cash with the assignee obligated to drill a well
free to the assignor. Once the well is completed, the parties share
in the operating expenses.
Treating the transaction as a sale, the assignor takes capital gain
on the cash received as follows:
Leasehold cost ---------------- $100,000
50% interest assigned 50,000
cash received ------------------- 80,000 (assignee
capitalizes)
Capital gain $30,000
192. Haynes v. U.S., 50 F. Supp. 238 (1943).
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This arrangement differs from the farm out in that the assignor
retains part of the working interest which is burdened with a share
of operating costs subsequent to those applicable to the first well.
The assignor retaining a fractional working interest also receives
title to a similar fractional portion of the well and equipment as
distinguished from the retention of only an override with full title
to the well and equipment in the assignee as is true in a typical
farm out.
As indicated the cash paid by the assignee is capitalized as
leasehold costs. The portion of the intangible drilling and devel-
opment costs applicable to the assignee's interest may be expensed
providing a proper election has been made.
Except for the cash changing hands, the transaction is tax
free.19 From a practical point of view, the assignor exchanges J2
the lease for 2 the well.
ABC DEAL
A wants three million for his lease and B wants to buy although
he doesn't have the cash and cannot borrow because high taxes
will prohibit paying the loan. To effectuate this deal, the following
type of arrangement, recognized by the Bureau, has been worked
out.
1) A sells B the working interest for $800,000 cash reserving
a $2,200,000 oil payment payable out of 80o of production
with interest at 5%7c. A then sells the oil payment to C bank
for $2,200,000.
Tax consequences:
A-capital gain on the three million dollars plus his desired
price for the property.
B-the working interest costs him $400,000. He receives only
20% of production which is offset by his operating costs.
C-the oil payment is income on which depletion may be
taken. His basis is $2,200,00. He receives negligible profit.




B-The instrument should clearly show C is a bona fide third
party to avoid having the Revenue Service contending C is
merely B's agent and thus tax oil payment to B.
193. S.M. 3322, IV-I, Cum. Bul. 112 (1925); G.C.M. 932, VI-1, Cum. Bul. 241
(1927).
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BUSINESS FORM
Corporate
No paper on this subject would be complete without some
reference to the business form used to effect oil and gas operations.
The Internal Revenue Code' provides in substance that no
gain or loss will be recognized from a transfer of property to a
corporation in exchange for its stock or securities and the trans-
ferors are in control of the corporation and receive stock or
securities substantially in proportion to their ownership of the
transferred property.
Questions concerned primarily with corporate tax law such as
what is considered substantial under the code section para-
phrased are outside the scope of this paper.
Section 112 (b) (5) contemplates the following elements:
1) The transfer must be solely in exchange for stock or securities.
Actually, the receipt of boot will not prevent the transfer
from being tax free to the extent the transfer is for stock or
securities. Liabilities assumed by the corporation or subject to
which the property is transferred are not considered in deter-
mining whether the transfer involved'boot, unless the purpose
of such assumption is not considered a valid business purpose.)"
One of the problems which may arise in this connection is that
known as a "negative basis." It is not unusual in oil and gas
operations for property in an unproven area to have a low basis,
intangible drilling and development costs having been expensed.
If the area becomes "hot," this low basis property will carry a
relatively high loan for financing development.
Assume the following:
1) property costs $25,000
2) an outstanding loan of $400,000 used for development
a) $150,000 tangible property subject to depreciation
b) $250,000 intangible drilling costs expensed
3) An incorporation is effected.
194. Section 112 (b) (5) is quoted as follows:
"No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to a corporation by ,e
or more persons solely in exchange for stock or securities in such corporation, and
immediately after the exchange such person or persons are in control of the corporation;
but in the case of an exchange by two or more persons this paragraph shall apply ornly
if the amount of the stock and securities received by each is substantially in proportion
to his interest in the property prior to the exchange. Where the transferee assumes a liability
of the transferor, or where the property of the transferor is transferred subject to a liability,
then for the purpose only of determining whether the amount of stock or securities re-
ceived by each of the transferors is in the proportion required by this paragraph, the amount
of such liability (if under subsection (k) it is not to be considered as "other property or
money") shall be considered as stock or securities received by such transferee."
195. Internal Revenue Code, Section 112 (k).
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Assuming a valid business purpose for borrowing the money,
Section 112 (k) (5) is satisfied and assumption of the debt does
not prevent the incorporation from being tax free. We thus have
a § 112 (b) (5) incorporation.
Following code section 113 (a) (6) which provides that the
basis of the stock in the individual's hands is his basis for the
property transferred in exchange for the stock, decreased by
any money received, and increased by any gain or decreased in
the amount of any loss recognized. Since code section 113 (a) (8)
gives the corporation the same basis in the property that the
transfereror had, the basis of the property in the example cited
would be ($175,000 minus $400,000) a minus or negative $225,000.
The leading case on negative basis is Beulah B. Crane v. Com-
missioner.1'" Mrs. Crane inherited property carried in the decedent's
gross estate at a value in the exact amount of an outstanding
mortgage. Mrs. Crane took depreciation of $28,000 over the
next few years and then sold her equity for $2,500. She had
never assumed the debt.
The Commissioner contended the depreciation taken and allowed
should be included in the amount realized.
Although the Commissioner was sustained by the second cir-
cuit court of appeals 97 and the supreme court' on appeal from
the tax court's original ruling that the basis was zero, the concept
of a negative basis is by no means condoned. In fact the Su-
preme Court said, "If, however, the amount of the annual allow-
ances were to be computed on the value of the property, and then
deducted from an equity basis, we would in some instances have
to accept deductions from a minus basis, of deny deductions
altogether." 1"'
It seems we may tentatively conclude the existence of a nega-
tive basis does not meet with too much favor. However, should
this result in avoiding the tax completely rather than postponing
it, the argument may be presented that the purpose of 112 (b) (5)
is being thwarted and our transaction not within its contemplation.
2) Transferor must be in control -° of the corporation im-
mediately after incorporation.
196. 331 u.s. 1 (1942).
197. 153 F.(2d) 504 (1945).
198. Note 196, supra.
199. Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 115 (a) and (d).
200. Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 112 (h):
"As used in this section the term 'control' means the ownership of stock possessing at
least 80 per centum of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled
to vote and at least 80 per centum of the total number of all other classes of stock of
the corporation."
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3) The stock or securities received must be in proportion to
the interests conveyed.
Problems encountered will not be peculiar to oil and gas. We
might mention that cash is considered property. 20 1 However, it
is doubtful if services would be so considered. In Columbia Oil
Company,20 2 one participant acted as attorney in working on the
organization and another performed services in connection with
securing subscription. It was held that neither transferred property.
Upon dissolution of the corporation, properties transferred to
the shareholders are considered payment in full for their stock.2"3
Gain is measured by the amount the property received exceeds in
value the basis of stock surrendered. The fair market value of
any oil payment received in distribution will likely be included
in aetermining gain or loss.2 4 The fair market value will then be
the basis for computing cost depletion on subsequent receipts .
20
1




A partial liquidation has similar tax consequences as a complete
liquidation. The basic tax problem is to avoid having the dis-
tribution considered a dividend. A company with highly productive
wells may have no accumulated earnings because of expensing
intangible drilling costs. Before assuming an opportunity exists
for distributing money or preperty without its being considered
a dividend, we must consider Section 115 (a) of the Code which
has the effect of making any distribution during a given year
taxable as dividends up to the amount of the earnings and profits
for that particular year.
Assuming a corporation distributed oil and gas interests to its
stockholders by way of a dividend, can the recipient claim de-
pletion? It would seem that possessing the requisite economic in-
terest, no question should arise since taxes on the dividend were
paid on distribution. This is likely the treatment which would be
permitted a distribution of an override, although some doubt is
cast because of Ingle Coal Corp. v. Commissioner207 denying a
201. Halliburton v. Comm'r., 78 F.(2d) 265; G.C.M. 24415, 1944, C.B. 219.
202. 41 B.T.A. 38 (1940), aff'd. on other issues, 118 F.(2d) 459 (5th Cir. 1941).
203. Internal Revenue Code, Section 115 (c):
"Amounts distributed in complete liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as fn
full payment in exchange for the stock, and amounts distributed in partial liquidation.
of a corporation shall be treated as in part or full payment in exchange for- the
stock . . . '"
204. Boudreau v. Comm'r., 134 F.(2d) 360 (5th Cir. 1943).
205. Oil and Gas Federal Income Tax Manual at 167-168, 7th Ed. (1953), Arthur
Andersen & Co.
206. E. C. Laster, 43 B.T.A. 159 (1940).
207. 10 T.C. 1199, 174 F.(2d) 569 (7th Cir. 1949).
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newly formed corporation a deduction for royalties paid to stock-
holders who reserved the interest.
Considerable more doubt is cast upon the right to deplete
receipts from an oil payment, whether short or long-lived as a
result of the Bureau's rulings.'8
Partnership
A partnership is defined in Section 3797 (a) (2) of the Internal
Revenue Code as follows:
"The term 'partnership' includes a syndicate, group, pool,
joint venture, or other unincorporated organization, through
or by means of which any business, financial operation, or
venture is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of
this title, a trust or estate or a corporation; and the term'partner' includes a member in such syndicate, group, pool,
joint venture, or organization . .
This code definition and the Regulations209 are so broad as to
create the problem of whether a particular factual situation re-
suits in a partnership for tax purposes though such is not the
intent of the parties.
An early ruling stated that co-ownership of oil and gas leases
falls with the term 'joint venture' thus in effect constituting a
partnership,2 1 even though the properties are operated through
an agent,211 this was modified in I.T. 278512 permitting an oil
and gas joint venture to simply attach to a partnership return,
an informational schedule showing revenues distributed and ex-
penses billed each co-owner, and the fractional interest owned
by these co-owners.
Then in 1948, I.T. 3930 '-1' was issued statting in effect that
joint operating agreements of the usual type contemplated in
I.T. 2749214 and I.T. 2785211 entered into by the co-owners of oil
and gas were to be henceforth treated as an association taxable
as a corporation within the meaning of Section 3793 (a) (3) of
the Code, rather than as a partnership as provided for in I.T.'s
2749 and 2785210
In I.T. 3930 the Bureau stated the typical features of this type
operating agreement to be:
208. G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 C.B. 66; I.T. 4003, 1950-1 C.B. 10.
209. Reg. 118, See. 39.3797-1 and 39.3797-4.
210. I.T. 2749, XIII-1, C.B. 99 (1934).
211. Ibid.
212. XIII-1 C.B. 96.
213. 1948-2 C.B. 126, See I.T. 3933, 1948-2, C.B. 130; I.T. 3948, 1949-1 C.B. 161.
214. Note 210, Supra.
215. Note 212, Supra.
216. Notes 210 and 212, Supra.
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"(1) The costs of development and expense of operation
are to be prorated among the parties in accordance with their
respective interests.
(2) Division of the oil proceeds is usually accomplished by
payment of the purchase price by the pipe-line company or
other purchaser directly to the several parties in accordance
with their respective shares as indicated by division orders
signed by them. Generally, any party may take his share of
oil in kind. Where the right exists any authority given the
operator to market the oil may be revoked upon proper notice.
Sometimes, however, the operator is authorized without quali-
fication to market the product.
(3) The operator is required to carry adequate insurance
and to make an accounting.
(4)Operating agreements remain in force until the mineral
is exhausted or, in the case of unit operating agreements, for
the term of the lease or leases or renewals thereof. Sometimes
an express provision is made for withdrawal of one of the
parties by assignment of his rights to others.
(5) The parties have voting power proportionate to their
interests to choose and advise the operator (in cases in which
only one lease is involved, broad powers are commonly vested
in the operator named in the agreement), to change the op-
erator, to -determine drilling and operating plans, to audit
and pass on the operator's accounting, and to pass on transac-
tions for disposal of surplus equipment.
(6) Any party may sell or encumber his entire interest, but
may not subdivide or sell without giving the others prefer-
ential option (in the case of agreements covering single leases,
the contract may not contain express provisions to that effect).
(7) The liabilities of the parties are to be separate and not
joint."
After distinguishing between a mining partnership as created
by this type of agreement and a general partnership,217 the I.T.-"'
went on to state, "It follows that under the statutory definitions
in question all forms of unincorporated business organizations for
joint profit are partnerships for income tax purposes except those
organizations which, by attaining the continuity of life and cen-
tralization of management characteristic of the corporate form
of organization, are by definition associations classifiable as cor-
porations."
217. Mining partnerships were pointed out as being different from general partnerships
principally in that the former
a. can arise only between joint operators
b. extend to and are terminated by the exhaustion of the mineral deposits
c. the majority in interest control policies
d. the death of the participant or the transfer of his interest does not interrupt
the relation-the heir or transferee becoming a participant."
218. Note 213, Supra.
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These two characteristics are part and parcel of the characteristic
known as "continuing succession" which permits a corporation to
continue despite changes among the owners or disagreements
between them.
Subsequently I.T. 1933219 relative to amending existing agree-
ments was issued and I.T. 3948220 clarifying I.T. 3930 was issued
in 1949. It limits treating operating agreements as associations
taxable as a corporation those creating organizations with a joint
profit objective.221 Further, the ruling states if some person or
persons are irrevocably authorized to act in a representative capa-
city for a fixed or determinable time to sell the production from
the joint operation for the account of two or more owners, an as-
sociation taxable as a corporation results.
It appears from the foregoing that a joint profit motive may
be rebutted by the existence of a revocable authority in the re-
presenting agency, or better yet, by a provision that each partici-
pant market his own share.
What is a collective irrevocable representative capacity within
the meaning of I.T. 3930? I.T. 3948 clarifies this by citing three
illustrations, the substance of which are:
a. If co-owners reserve the right to take his share of produc-
tion, and subsequently two or more of these co-owners con-
tract in the same instrument with one purchaser, a "represent-
ative capacity" does not exist since each co-owner is exercis-
ing his own discretion.
b. one co-owner may irrevocably authorize a person (other
than another co-owner) to dispose of his share of production
without creating a "representative capacity" as this also is
deemed to be the exercise of the co-owner's own business
discretion.
c. "Representative capacity" does not exist if discretionary
authority terminable at will is granted to a person repre-
senting two or more co-owners if the period is 'reasonable
. . . consistent with the minimum needs of the industry
under the circumstances" but not to exceed one year.
The McAdams case 222 although turning on the question of what
year a cash basis taxpayer can deduct drilling expenditures paid
219. 1948-2 C.B. 130.
220. 1949-1 C.B. 161.
221. It is probably purely speculation as to how long it will take before the principle
of I.T. 3930 supposedly limited only to organizations created by joint operating agreements,
is extended to other fields. See Herman v. U.S. 81 F. Supp. 963 (D.C. Mo. 1949)
in which it was held that where two individuals contributed money to finance a liquor store
venture, the business of which was actively carried on by a third party as agent and in
which the only interest the other parties had was in a percentage of the profits, the joint
venture constituted an association taxable as a corporation for federal income tax purposes.
22. 15 T.C. 231 (1950).
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with borrowed funds, contains dictum worth noting. The facts
briefly are:
McAdams and co-owners drilled several wells on their leases
in 1940 and 1941. Petitioner was unable to pay his Share of
drilling costs in the years expenses incurred. Another co-
owner paid them for taxpayer. When taxpayer reimbursed the
paying co-owner in 1944 and 1945, he deducted the payments.
HELD: as indicated above, the item was deductible in 1940-41
on theory McAdams borrowed the money.
The Court also said:
"... The evidence in these proceedings strongly indicate
that (the co-owner who made the loan) and the petitioner
were operating the leases as a .. .partnership, sometimes re-
ferred to as a mining partnership. Although the petitioner
testified he never felt that he was a partner of Luse (the co-
owner) he also testified that he considered that he was drilling
these leases along with Luse; that he knew about the drilling
operations and expected to pay his part; and that he and Luse
jointly pursued the drilling on the two leases .... Under the
law of Texas such a partnership or joint adventure may be
created by . . . the joint ownership and joint operation of the
enterprise."
A recent non-oil and gas case emphasized the fact that whether
a joint venture exists is still an open question. The 1950 case of
Bartholomew221 involved the adoption of a new accounting method,
and the court defined a joint venture as existing "when two or
more persons combine in a joint business enterprise for their mutual
benefit, with an express or implied understanding or agreement that
they are to share in the profits and losses of the enterprise, and
that each is to have a voice in its control and management." The
court then cited Commissioner v. Tower224 for the following propo-
sition: "When the existence of an alleged partnership arrangement
is challenged by outsiders, the question arises whether the partners
really and truly intended to join together for the purpose of carry-
ing on business and sharing in profits or losses or both," and quoted
the Culbertson225 test of intent.
22
It thus appears that despite the Bureau Rulings the Tax Court is
223. 9 T.C.M. 302 (1950) reversed (8th Cir. 1951) 186 F.(2d) 315; 10 T.C.M. 957.
224. 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
225. Comm'r. v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
226. "The question is . . .whether, considering all the facts-the agreement, the con-
duct of the parties in execution of its provisions, their statements, the testimony
of the parties, their respective abilities and capital contributions, the actual control of
income and the purposes for which it is used, and other facts throwing light on their true
intent-the parties in good faith and acting with a business purpose intended to join
together in the present conduct of the enterprise."
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strongly influenced by the intent element, the necessity for which
can be traced to common law .
2
27
Two theories are advanced as to the nature of a partnership for
tax purposes.221
Under the "aggregate" theory, when a partner sells his interest
in the partnership he sells his interest as joint owner of each firm
asset. His gain is thus taxed upon the basis for the period each
asset is held.
Under the entity theory the sale of a partnership interest is the
sale of one intangible asset not several tangible assets.
The Bureau has, however, reversed its position in issuing G.C.M.
263791 2 in which it held the sale of a partnership interest should
be treated as a sale of a capital asset.
Generally speaking, since a partnership is not a taxable entity,
transfers to and withdrawals from a partnership do not have the
complex tax problems encountered in corporate transactions.
We are safe in saying that partners realize no gain or loss on a
distribution in kind, until the property is subsequently sold..
2 30
However, a withdrawal of property requires an allocation of basis
which can be best referred to by an illustration.
Assume X and Y invest $100,000 each in a partnership. With-
drawals total $50,000 each and net taxable income is $20,000. Book
value of depreciable and depletable properties are $60,000 and
$10,000 respectively. Fair market value of depletable and depreci-
able properties are $400,000 and $60,000 respectively.
The basis in hands of X and Y is determined as follows:
Investment $100,000
Net taxable incom e -------------------------------------------------- - 20,000
$120,000
W ithdrawals ------------------------------------------------------------- $ 50,000
227. Waddell v. Comm'r., 102 F.(2d) 303 (5th Cir. 1939).
228. See the American Law Institute Draft of a proposed partnership tax law revision,
9 Tax Law Review 140-1 (1954).
229. 1950-1 C.B. 58.
230. Sec. 39.113 (a) (13)-2 states ..... ... If the partnership distributes its assets
in kind and not in cash, the partner realizes no gain or loss until he disposes of the
property received in liquidation. .... "
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Allocated to depletable & depreciable
p ro p erties as ------------------------------------------------------------ $ 7 0 ,0 0 0
follows:
Type FMV %
D epreciable ------------------ 60,000 20 ---------------- 14,000
Depletable $400,000 80 ---------------- $ 56,000
$460,000 100 $ 70,000
There are various other factors requiring tax-wise consideration.
Iti is not intended to de-emphasize any. However, while pertinent,
they are properly the subject of a paper dealing solely with tax
problems resulting from a partnership form of doing business.
Suffice it to say that a brief introduction into the partnership phase
evidences the scope of the oil and gas tax field.
UNITIZING AND CYCLING AGREEMENTS
Since a cycling operation generally requires a unitization of
minerals, it is in essence a phase of unitization '1 and will be dis-
cussed with it.
Unitization essentially is a pooling of interests so that drilling
in a given area is conducted as though the area constituted a
single unit. Participants have a proportionate interest in the unit
based on the ratio of the property contributed to the total property.
A cycling plant, simply stated, is a plant used to manufacture
gas from a high pressure wet gas. Because it is a manufacturing
operation as distinguished from a producing process, oil and gas
tax problems arise.
We can readily see that whether the participants have created
a taxable entity apart from the participants themselves is a prime
problem and one which can be avoided by a properly drawn uni-
tizing agreement along principles discussed in connection with I. T.
3930, supra.
Gross Income
When the same parties own the lease and the cycling plant, and
no posted field price exists for the wet gas before processing, a
problem of allocating gross income between production and manu-
facturing sources arises. To the extent it is from an essentially
manufacturing source, it will not result from an economic interest
in oil or gas in place and will be non-depletable.
231. See McKeon, Tax Pharases of Cycling Operations, Fourth Annual Institute on Oil
and Gas Law and Taxaton, pp. 281 et seq. (1953).
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The first and last ones are apparently accepted as a producing
operation. The other two contain more elements of a manufactur-
ing nature; it is likely that problems will arise in that area. Your
writer is presently unaware of any decisions crystalizing the issue
so as to permit properly classifying them as either essentially a
producing or a manufacturing operation.
It is also an unsettled question as to whether receipts from a
royalty interest are receipts from the "property" under the Code:-:';'
as to permit the holder of the working interest to exclude it front
his gross income. Essentially the question should turn primarily
on a factual determination of whether it is from a production or a
cycling operation and further if cycling income, whether that is or
is not a production process. Once those are determined, basic oil
and gas law should control. In any event, there should be con-
sistency between treatment accorded receipts to the royalty holder.
and the working interest treatment.
"34
Intangible Drilling and Development Costs:
Water input wells have been held to be sufficiently similar to all
oil well to permit similar tax treatment." ::  This would seem to
bring I. D. & D. costs of such wells within the option permitting
deduction. -"
To illustrate participation in a unitized area the following ex-
ample is used. It is assumed for illustration purposes that each
participant's interest is agreed upon without considering the fair
market value of equipment and the leasehold. In our example, it
is based on estimated mineral content of the leases contributed.
I. D. & D. costs have been expenses and therefor do not affect the
fair market value of the leasehold.
232. Ibid at 295.
233. Section 114 (b) (3).
'In the case of oil and gas wells the allowance for depletion under section 2:3 (in) shall
be 271/, per centum of the gross income of the property .
234. Ibid.
- . . . excluding from such gross income an amount equal to any retts or royalties paid
or incurred by the taxpayer in respect of the property . . . "
235. Page Oil Co. v. Comm'r., 41 B.T.A. 952 (1940).
236. Regulations 118, Sec. 39.23 (m)-16(h).
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Three questions arising from a unitizing agreement are:
1) Will retention of title to the leases by the individual parti-
cipants prevent an exchange of equipment for equipment?
Apparently, the answer is no, if the agreement spells out the in-
tention of exchanging equipment, under authority of a 1940 case
-2 3 7
which inferentially supports this conclustion. This case denied
petitioner's contention that equipment was exchanged for equip-
ment but did so because of absence of proof. In the court's words
"there is no support in the record for such a conclusion."
2) Does the exchange by a participant of his lease-hold equip-
ment for an interest in the unit result in a taxable gain or
loss?
Whether title to the leases are retained or not, the practical result
of the transaction is an exchange of one economic interest for an-
other. Each exchanged interest is a working interest and thus falls
within the provisions of Section 112(b) (1) covering tax free ex-
changes of like properties. However, Section 112(c) (1) comes
into play since cash is received.
Illustration: Equipment
(A) (B) (C)
Proceeds realized on exchange ----------- $100,000 $80,000 $40,000
Basis ----------------------------- 80,000 50,000 20,000
Gain ---------------------------- $ 20,000 $30,000 $20,000
Taxable gain limited to cash received ---- $ 20,000
Leasehold
Proceeds realized on exchange -------------- $140,000
Tax basis -------------------------------------------------- -- 1,000
$139,000
Taxable recognition limited to
C ash received ---------------------------------------- $ 40,000
Cash payments are additions to basis.
3) How is the basis of assets adjusted after unit formation?
EQUIPMENT
A B C
Basis of property exchanged ------------------- $80,000 $50,000 $20,000
Less money received --------------------------- 20,000
$60,000 $50,000 $20,000
237. E. C. Laster, 41 B.T.A. 159 (1940).
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Add gain recognized on exchange -------- 20,000
$80,000 $50;000 $20,000
Add money paid Tax basis ---------------------------------------- $20,000
$80,000 $50,000 $40,000
LEASEHOLD
Basis of leases exchanged $ 5,000 $ 1,000
Less money received ------------------------------- 40,000
$ 5,000 --------- (39,000)
Add recognized gain --------------- 39,000
5,000
Add money paid ---------------------------------------- -- - ----  40,000
T ax b asis ------------------------------------------------------ $5,000 $40,000 
TAX PLANNING
Tax planning consistently applied can avert many unpleasant
and unexpected results from a consummated transaction. It implies
consideration of possible results prior to completing the proposed
move, and then carrying it out in a manner which will result in the
minimum tax liability consistent with good business practice. It
obviously involves an element of predictability on the part of the
tax advisors-determining how the Bureau or Courts might react to
a set of facts distinguished in some particular from a situation
where their reaction has been adverse to the taxpayer.
Query?
In a carried interest arrangement, how can we control the
deduction for intangible drilling and development costs?
Solution:
If A, the assignor does not need the deduction whereas B,
the assignee does, an absolute assignment should be effect-
ed with a reversion in A at the end of the payout period.
This is the Manahan situation, supra.
If each is to have his share, an Abercrombie situation should
be set up under which A will retain legal title and the as-
signee under a contractual agreement will apply proceeds
from A's interest against development costs.
Facts:
1) A purchases from B an undivided interest in certain
leases for $100,000.
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2) A wants I. D. & D. cost deduction but wishes to limit his
liability for such costs to $100,000.
Solution : 23
1) The contract should expressly state two considerations,
one for the drilling of the well and the other for the lease.
2) The contract should expressly state that the lease interest
is acquired in consideration of A's financing the drilling
of a well. This will avoid the implication of only an im-
plied obligation of B to use funds for drilling.
A then has a working interest entitled to an I. D. & D.
cost deduction and B is drilling for A as an independent
contractor.
Query?
How can X avoid losing the depletion otherwise allowable,
but unavailable because of high development costs and the
50% limitation feature? (assume cost depletion nominal)
Example:
Depletable gross income ------------------- $100,000
Net income, after deducting I. D. & D. costs --------. 0
Depletion limited to 50/. of net income -- - 0
Solution:
Anticipate income by selling an oil payment carved out of a
larger interest.
Example:
Depletable gross income from production -.--------- $100,000
Sale of oil payment ------------------------------------------------ 100,000
Deduct I. D. & D. costs -------------------- (100,000)
N et incom e -----------------------------------------------------------------. $100,000
Depletion is 27%. of gross Income of $200,000
Limited to 50% of net income -------------------------------- $ 50,000
Note: This would, of course, affect future years income; this
factor should be considered and computations made-
based on the effect of such a transaction when poten-
tial reserves are known.
The foregoing illustrations merely indicate the varied types of
possibilities which exist.
As is true in so many fields each phase of a topic contains in-
finite variations and possibilities for expansion as to constitute
virtually a limitless subject in itself. In generally surveying the
field of oil and gas federal income taxation, we have in no sense
exhausted any one phase. We have tried to hit the high spots in
several.
238. Sidney Platt v. Conm'r.. 18 T.C. 1229 (1952) aff'd.
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